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Abstract
Governments of English-speaking Caribbean countries have begun to place greater emphasis on
e-government to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and are encouraging, through legislation and
other inducements, the expansion of e-commerce operations in order to enhance global
competitiveness. This has expectedly led to a greater movement of data and with it information
security risks. Information security managers continue to grapple with the difficulty of reengineering policies and standards to meet this new reality. Hence many Caribbean organizations
have become more vulnerable to security risks that are initiated internally. This is of grave
concern to the Financial Institutions of the Caribbean as they prepare to offer extended services
in order to exploit the opportunities expected from the introduction of the Caribbean Single
Market and Economy. In addition, these institutions attempt to increase their share of both
remittances from the Caribbean Diaspora and foreign direct investments which also serve to
exacerbate these issues. These organizations are less capable of stemming the tide of fraud
through identity theft and by other means, which are on the rise globally. In most cases these acts
are facilitated (inadvertently or deliberately) by the actions of insiders. This paper proposes an
approach to the development of context-based information security policies for Caribbean
Financial Institutions aimed at mitigating insider risks.
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Information security, Agency Theory, Institutional Theory, Social Learning Theory, and
Deterrence Theory.

1. Introduction
The internet has provided organizations with additional alternatives for structuring their business
interests and operations. Businesses worldwide leverage this effective medium to distribute
information related to products and services and to complete transactions in order to extend their
global reach (Chang and Arnett, 2000). The financial sector in particular, has aggressively
adopted the use of internet-based applications, primarily to provide Electronic Banking (ebanking) services to their customers on one hand, and to derive efficiency benefits for their
internal processes on the other (Dewan, 2001; Liao, 2003).
E-Banking is an effective medium for funds transfer for many Caribbean Financial Institutions
(CFIs) that are vying for an increasing share of the increasing movement of dollars between the
Caribbean and other areas of the world, and within the region itself. The services sector in the

English-speaking Caribbean (ESC), as is the case in many other countries, continues to account
for a progressively larger share of GDP - over 67 per cent in 2006 (CIA, n.d.). The economic
pillars of ESC countries are tourism, foreign direct investments, and remittances from members
of the Caribbean Diaspora. In addition, the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) is
poised to become a reality and will also contribute to an increase in the funds transferred within
the region. CSME is an integrated development strategy aimed at: (1) concretizing economic
integration among CARICOM members (2) leveraging the economic resources of these nations,
and (3) making the CARICOM region a viable trading block (CARICOM, n.d.).
Consequently, CFIs are engaging more in E-banking (Xu and Bowrin, 2005), which allows
customers to conduct financial transactions electronically, (primarily) over the Internet, using
personal or handheld computers or the telephone. CFIs seek the benefits of increased service
accessibility and availability afforded by e-banking, which in turn force them to deploy these
services as a competitive necessity.
The commitment of CFIs to E-banking and to other online transactions and the attendant
proliferation of the traffic of digitized data (both within and across organizational boundaries)
further heighten the need for guaranteeing the security of these transactions. However, for many
ESC countries this is either new territory, new scale, or both (Xu and Bowrin, 2005); many of
these organizations have struggled to protect purely internal transactions. The sensitivity and the
myriad risks associated with data movement over the Internet have exacerbated what was already
a growing concern, and have served to constrain the growth of e-commerce (Shelly et al., 2006).
The slow pace of the development of Government legislation to protect Internet transactions,
despite the commitment to the CSME, is yet another reason for CFIs to focus more keenly on
security issues.
The foregoing provides the impetus for this conceptual paper, which examines the imminence of
the explosion of e-banking services in the CARICOM region, for all the reasons indicated,
against the less than robust information security policies and practices that now exist or are
contemplated. In this analysis, we survey the literature to identify support for prescriptions for
bolstering information security in this domain. Many researchers have long subscribed to the fact
that effective information security policies ought to be cognizant of behavioural, deterrence, and
security awareness educational concepts (Siponen, 2006; Straub, 1998). Additionally, because of
the low perceived importance and the general lack of prescriptive approaches for the
implementation of information security regimes within the region, we believe that Learning,
Deterrence, Managerial Control, Agency and Institutional theories will provide the bases for a
framework for understanding the issues and for generating a plausible baseline for remedying
this situation for CFIs. We will use this framework ourselves and contribute it for use in future
research.
In the remainder of this paper we undertake a literature review, discuss the theoretical pillars that
support our proposed solution, and offer a conclusion.

2. Background Information
Scott (2001) defines an institution as a highly resilient social structure comprised of culturedcognitive, normative and regulative elements that in conjunction with activities and resources
provide stability and meaning to social life. This definition is reflected in the institutional carriers

(symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and artifacts) that he identified. Björck (2004)
posit that symbolic systems typically are rules, laws, values, expectations, categories,
typifications and schema. Relational systems speak to governance systems, regimes, authority
systems, structural isomorphism, and identities. Routines refer to protocols, standard operating
procedures, jobs, roles, obedience to duty, and scripts, while artifacts are considered to be objects
complying with mandated specifications, objects meeting conventions, standards, and objects
which possess symbolic value.
Typically, open system organisations contend with both an external and an internal operating
environment. The conditions of the external environment are dictated by the legal and regulatory
framework - Symbolic Systems; the internal environment is driven largely by relational systems,
routines and artifacts. The information security climate at the national level, to a large extent
influences the information policies developed at the organizational level, for example the types
of organizational information security policies developed post Sarbanes-Oxley implementation
(Francoeur, 2004). Similarly, information security legislation within the ESC also influences the
policies developed for local firms. As depicted in Figure 1, these distinct environments can
impose their own influences on an organization’s information security policy.

Figure 1: The existing Information Security Policy Development Process.

Smith and Jamieson (2006) posit that information security is the ability to ensure that the
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information are effectively maintained by way of
policies and technological assets. For example, the adoption of e-commerce as a business
channel by many modern firms has heightened information security concerns for both financial
institutions, governments and other organizational units (Baskerville, 2002; Dewan, 2001).
Cyber crime reports recently published by the FBI/CSI suggest that these fears are not
unfounded. Recent statistics on identity theft estimated the losses due to information theft and

acts of fraud at over JMD$1.2 billion (approximately USD$17.1Million) in Jamaica alone
between 2000 to 2006 (Williams, 2006).
Stemming the upsurge of these incidents is very important for most countries but more so for the
ESC, which is attempting to establish itself as regional trading block. Based on its location, it is
expected to experience high traffic in financial transactions primarily from Trans-Atlantic trade,
tourism and increased foreign direct investments within the region. Organizations in the
developing world have largely bought into the need for effective IT governance (Weill and
Woodham, 2004), which according to Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) is the means of
establishing decision rights and, ultimately, lines of accountability for and control of key IT
decisions. However, in the Caribbean a new mindset is required to safeguard these transactions
as most Caribbean firms rely almost entirely on their Information Systems departments to lead
the effort in securing their information assets ( Xu and Bowrin, 2005).
IT Governance structure provides an all-encompassing framework for enforcing compliance with
information security controls; however, the controls are generally implemented using any one of
the industry’s widely accepted Information Security Management Standards (ISMS) such as, the
control objectives for information and related technology (CobiT). This combination of
governance and ISMS is required to create an environment which fosters confidentiality and
security of the data for which the FIs have custodial rights (Francoeur, 2004; Xu, 2005).
However, while these ISMSs provide excellent guidelines for the creation of information
security oriented processes, they offer very little implementation content and information related
to achieving success from ISMSs. Current information security management standards offer very
little prescriptions for ensuring congruence between objectives and outcomes (Siponen, 2006) or
benchmarks for determining implementation success. According to (Eloff, 2003), security
managers have to grapple with both social and technical issues in order to develop effective
security solutions. Unfortunately, a holistic solution is not so easily defined. Security concerns
related to technical issues can often be resolved by implementing technology-based solutions. In
an organizational context there are myriad variables (including social behaviours) that are at play
which, according to (Hilbert, 2003), are influenced by the macro culture and political climate in
which the firm operates. However, finding a solution to incorporating these variables into an
information security policy is not as simple.
In the ESC, the financial institutions continue to lead the charge towards incorporating
ecommerce into business strategy (Xu, 2005). However, current security plans can be restrictive,
expensive, time consuming, and, in some cases, cannot be implemented on the Internet
(Hagyavati and Hicks, 2003). In addition, information security and business objectives are often
conflicting, and in some cases mutually exclusive. For example, there is an increasing desire on
the part of organizations to use the Internet as another channel for conducting business activities
(Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). The pitfall is that the Internet is based on openness and
flexibility and not necessarily for security. These conflicting ideals have often contributed to the
difficulty in aligning business and information security objectives (Hamill et al, 2004).
Given this need for carefully crafted security policies with appropriate content which is
cognizant of social context, we will appeal to Learning, Deterrence, Control, Agency and
Institutional theories in order to explicate the complex relationships, provide a framework for
understanding them and assisting with the generation of a plausible approach to developing a
comprehensive policy with content relevant to both the technical and social contexts. The

security policies so developed will be used to inform the ISMS implementation in ESC countries.
These are discussed in the next section with a brief explanation of how each theory will be used
and why. We envision information security management within a firm as the joint responsibility
of the information security managers and the other internal stakeholders.

3. Theoretical Pillars
Siponen and Kukkonen (2007) identify four elements that an effective information security
management strategy should encompass. These include: controlled access to information
systems, secure communication, security management, and the development of secure
information systems. Of these four objectives, controlled access to information and assurances
for the security of data in storage and in motion relate directly to the security of electronic
transactions. Many researchers contend that the human element is the most challenging variable
to manage in the context of information security (Adams, 1999; Gonzales, 2002; Siponen, 2000).
They further suggest that solutions to this problem lay in the realm of behavioural/motivational
theories.
By Hewitt’s (1986) definition, Financial Institutions that engage in e-banking are typical of open
system organisations, which consist of both internal and external operating environments. The
effectiveness of the external environment in the context of information security is determined by
the macro information security policy (government legislation, industry standards and
regulations). The effectiveness of the internal information security environment on the other
hand is determined by how well the security regime is defined and articulated. Acharya (2001)
defines security regime as the principles, norms and rules which regulate state behaviour. In the
context of information security, a security regime encompasses the principles, norms and rules
which regulate information security behaviours.

3.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory has been used to study contractual arrangements in a wide range of disciplines
including accounting, sociology and organizational behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989), primarily for
describing the driving forces which determine the nature of the relationship between a principal
and an agent, both in the case of a firm with external contractors and the firm, and the fiduciary
arrangements between the management of the firm and its owners (Basu and Lederer, 2004).
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that the issues related to agency relationships stems from goal
incongruence between principal and agent and also from the inability of the principal to
determine if the agent has acted in the best interest of the principal.
Researchers have classified agents’ behaviours into two types, adverse selection and moral
hazard. According to Eisenhardt (1989) the former occurs when the agent misrepresents his
abilities and operates in a manner which makes it difficult for the principal to falsify his/her
claims. Moral hazard manifests in situations where the agent does not expend the agreed effort in
completing the assigned task(s). This translates to six variables upon which agency type
relationships are premised: shirking (agents not expending enough effort towards the goals of the
principal); information asymmetry (agents withholding vital information from the principal);
goal conflict, task programmability (the extent to which the appropriate behaviour of the agent
can be predetermined); contract type (behaviour based and outcome based); and monitoring
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Mahaney and Lederer 2003).

Walsh and Schnieder (2002) demonstrated that in contrast to the classical depiction of a single
principal/agent relationship, Agency theory may well involve multiple relationships (e.g., in
software development teams). Additionally, Adams (1994) believed that a firm can be viewed as
an arrangement of contracts between resource owners (principals) and those dependent on the
resource (agents) (Adams, 1994). The way in which these contracts are initiated and
subsequently executed is determined by available information and the influence of incentives
(Basu and Lederer, 2004). These conditions create an environment that facilitates the
development of agency relationships.
We will use the Adams (1994) approach to explicate the nature of the controls that are needed to
govern the principal-agent relationship which exists between the information security managers
(principals) and other internal stakeholders (agents) with the context of information security
function of a CFI.

3.2 Management Control Theory
Simons (1995) define management control systems as the formal information-based routines and
procedures manager use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities. He identified
four control systems as related to business strategy: belief systems (based on core values);
boundary systems (to limit opportunistic behaviours); interactive control systems (to stimulate
organisational learning); and diagnostic control systems (to measure output and performance).
Duane and Finnegan (2000) extended this list of controls by including internal controls
(procedural checks and balances to ensure data integrity). Das and Teng (2001) then identified
three approaches to internal control within the context of a principal/agent relationship. These
controls are behaviour-based, output-based and social controls. Behaviour-based controls
measure behaviours to ensure compliance with the desired behaviour while Output-based
controls measure outcomes to ensure that they are in accordance with desired outcomes. In both
cases the metrics are formally declared and agreed upon by the principal and the agent. Social
controls are far more informal and rely heavily on the organisation’s culture and shared goals to
bring about compliance with the desired behaviours or outcomes (Rasmusson, 1996).
In terms of information security, Baskerville (1988) advocated the existence of four categories of
controls, namely deterrent controls (reflection of the strength/enforceability of the organisational
information security policies), detective controls (threat identification), corrective controls
(reactive threat mitigation), and preventative (proactive threat mitigation). We believe that the
formulation of information security policies should span all four categories in order to be
effective. We will use this expanded view of management control theory to elucidate the
relationships between these types of controls and the internal information security environment
and hence their role(s) in the formulation of effective organizational information security policy
for CFIs.

3.3 Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory emerged from military strategy utilized during the Cold War era, in which
contending sides invoked strategies to convince the other that the success of an attack would pale
in comparison to the consequences of retaliatory response. This disincentive includes deterrence
by punishment or by denial. Deterrence by denial in the context of information security would be
the implementation of security policies with explicitly stringent (and enforceable) punitive

measures. Deterrence by punishment is the enforcement of these punitive measures once a
breach has occurred and the guilty party is identified. In the Caribbean, information security is
still given a relatively low priority. This is evident in the fact that only four of the twenty-six
Caribbean countries have enacted electronic transaction legislation to promote accountability for
information security breaches (Corbin, n.d.), and very few firms employ information security
specialists.

3.4 Social Learning Theory
Perceptions about learning have undergone significant shifts in emphasis from mere focus on
behaviour change to the modern view of learning as a process. This process view has facilitated
the development of the Learning Theory (Smith, 1999). Merriam and Caffarella (1991) had
posited three categories of learning: behavioural, cognitive, and humanistic-oriented learning.
However, Smith (1999) added social- or situational-oriented learning. The behavioural view of
learning is aimed at producing behavioural change in a desired direction; the cognitive view is
aimed at developing capacity and skill to learn better; the humanistic view is aimed at attaining
self actualization and autonomy; The social/situational view is where the acquisition of new
knowledge causes the subject to interact with his/her environment.
In order to implement an effective information security regime in a CFI, information security
content must contain a learning component. This component could then be the catalyst for
effecting lasting change(s) in attitudes of the individuals within the organisation towards
information security. The expected outcome of this change is the development of an information
security aware workforce. This educational component would be based on learning theory aimed
at engendering the desired behaviours and attitudes towards information security within the firm.
The impact of this would be the development of a workforce which proactively manages the
firm’s exposure to information security risks.

3.5 Institutional Theory
Björck (2004) describes Institutional Theory as a rich theoretic lens which allows us to explicate
the factors affecting social behaviour within an organisation. Some of the underlying principles
of institutional theory are isomorphism, structuration, cultural persistence and legitimacy.
Organizations often go through many changes throughout their years of operation; these changes
may be due to coercive forces (because of the need to comply with industry best practice,
legislation, regulation and mandates), mimetic forces (due the need to reduce uncertainty) or
normative forces (due to the need to conform to the organization’s view of normal practices).
Within an industry, these forces often result in organizational homogeneity or isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Giddens (1979) define the process of structuration as the
relationship between the institutional properties of social systems and human action. Zucker
(1987) describe cultural persistence as emerging from three processes: habitualization (patterned
problem solving of new problems); objectification (a shared ontology of problems and their
treatment) and sedimentation (the adoption of the shared ontology as the norm). Legitimacy
refers to the process of weaving behaviours into the social fabric of the organization and in so
doing legitimize their existence (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The institutional view of a firm allows for a more holistic view of the factors influencing how the
firm operates within its environment. Applying this theoretic lens to the firm helps to explain

how the organization is influenced by internal and external factors (Zucker, 1987). For the
purposes of this study institutional theory will be used to illustrate relevant internal and external
environmental factors which warrant consideration when organizational information security
policies are being developed.

4. Towards a Solution
The establishment of a viable information security regime is no longer considered to be
predominantly technology-related and the purview of IS/IT departments (Dhillon, 2000). Deeper
consideration is given to what strategies will be needed to allow for the indiscriminate
acceptance of these technologies by end users (Arief, 2003; Aytes, 2004). According to Xu and
Bowrin (2005), this phenomenon is gradually becoming the norm within the Caribbean.
This paper proffers a model (figure 2) which represents a synthesis of these theories in
establishing a framework which information security practitioners can use in the development of
information security policies specific to their organizations. We also will contribute the findings
of this research to the research community as a means of providing extensions to the boundaries
of the theories used. This model can be useful in providing prescriptions for the development of
information security policies based on the internal and external information security
environments within which the target firm operates. The external information security
environment is driven by macro information security issues – government legislation, industry
standards and regulations, while the internal information system security environment is largely
influenced by the security regime implemented within the firm. Currently, researchers are of the
view that the security regime will typically entail the combination of managerial, technological
and physical controls. Here we propose that this view be extended to include a social learning
component in order to effect the wholesale and sustained behavioural change towards
information security with CFIs.

Figure 2: The Contextual Information Security Policy Development (CIPD) Model

There exists a reflective relationship between context and behaviour (Scott, 2001). As a result,
the process of developing information security policies using this model begins with an
assessment of the situational factors relevant to the organization. These situational factors stem
from social learning and managerial control factors.
Initially, we will engage in a process of seeking to identify the factors which facilitate learning in
the organizational context for firms in ESC countries. Similarly, we will then validate what are
the factors that positively affect the other situational factors (technology, managerial controls)
within the targeted firm. In so doing we will derive the organizational security regime variables
relevant to that firm. At the secondary level, we will then seek to elucidate what are the internal
and external information security factors which influence the institutionalization of information
security policies.
Though the CISPD model provides a comprehensive framework for the development of a
contextually aware information security policy, we recognize that is need for further refinement
of the theoretic base of the model in order to reduce the number of variables by identifying a set
of critical factors. Kim and Mueller (1978a) recommended the use of exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) only in cases where there exists a minimum of three (3) input variables. Also, EFA would
provide a means for us to gain a better understanding of the underlying structure of the
relationship between the variables implied by each theory used.
Our proposed model suggests the existence of a number of causal relationships. The next stage of
this research will be to test the validity of the model by first examining the set of propositions
presented in table 1.

5. Conclusion
The current approaches to information security within firms in ESC countries are not as mature
as those in developed countries (Xu and Bowrin, 2005). However, the pressures of globalization
on the competitiveness of regional firms will serve as a catalyst for motivating an awakening to
the importance of information security and its role in achieving competitive advantage.
Information security policies are typically designed to secure information systems and their
outputs. However, these systems or outputs are ultimately used by people (Aytes, 2004).
Acceptance of this fact implies the need for social and psychological controls to be central to the
development of information security policy. Due to the issues influenced by culture and knowhow as well as the trust and risk climates that exist in the application domain, these controls need
to be very specific.
We have therefore contributed the proposed model, which synthesizes several relevant theories
in an attempt to explicate relevant socio-technical relationships that bear on an effective
information security regime for the ESC. Eventually we hope to test the validity of the model
and to use it ourselves, and to offer it to the research community for refinement, to advance
research in this area in order to provide information security practitioners within CFIs with rich
insights that are tailored to the idiosyncrasies of their internal and external operating
environments, which in turn will help them to create contextually conscious information security
policies.

Table 1: The Contextual Information Security Policy Development (CISPD) Model propositions
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